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AN AMERICAN ICON IN LIMBO:  
HOW CLARIFYING THE STANDING 
DOCTRINE COULD FREE WILD HORSES 
AND EMPOWER ADVOCATES 
NADIA AKSENTIJEVICH* 
Abstract: The American wild horse has long been considered a cultural icon and 
an integral part of the ecosystem.  In recognition of the need for wild horse pro-
tection, Congress enacted the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act in 
1971. Although the Act instructs Congress to manage the wild horse population 
by removing “excess” wild horses from public lands, it does not explicitly pro-
vide for the use of short- or long-term holding facilities as a means for removal. 
In considering the legality of the use of holding facilities in the service of wild 
horse removal programs that the plaintiffs deplore, two district courts have come 
to opposite conclusions on the standing issue of how directly the plaintiffs’ injury 
must be linked to the particular action being challenged. This Note argues that if 
the wild horse dispute comes before the Supreme Court in the form of a circuit 
split, the Court should hear the case to resolve lingering ambiguities in standing 
causation. Specifically, the Court should apply proximate cause analysis to the 
standing causation inquiry, as this would promote many of standing’s underlying 
functions and also benefit advocates. 
INTRODUCTION 
The American wild horse is considered a cultural icon.1 Historically, wild 
horses populated the western plains in the millions.2 Although the law under-
scores that wild horses are an integral part of the natural ecosystem,3 current 
administrative practice permits only 26,500 wild horses to roam the lands.4 
                                                                                                                           
 * Senior Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 Tim Opitz, The Tragedy of the Horse, American Icon, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 357, 359 (2011) 
(citing Laura Jane Durfee, Anti-Horse Slaughter Legislation: Bad for Horses, Bad for Society, 84 IND. 
L.J. 353, 353 n.2 (2009)). 
 2 Roberto Iraola, The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 35 ENVTL. L. 1049, 
1050 (2005) (“At one time numbering in the millions, by the 1960s, the horse population had declined 
to seventeen thousand.”). 
 3 Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“[T]hey are to be consid-
ered in the area where presently found, as an integral part of the natural system of the public lands.”). 
 4 Wild Horse and Burro Quick Facts, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/
en/prog/whbprogram/history_and_facts/quick_facts.print.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2014), available 
at http://perma.cc/996R-V6NW. 
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Federal population controls now place the majority of wild horses, roughly 
50,000, in captivity underwritten by federal tax revenue.5 Because the spirit, 
beauty, and freedom embodied in wild horses strikes a chord in Americans,6 
the government’s management of their population provokes emotional, judi-
cial, and legislative responses.7   
Originally, Congress took control of wild horse population management 
to address dwindling wild horse numbers in the 1960s.8 In recognition of the 
need for wild horse protection, Congress passed the Wild Free-Roaming Hors-
es and Burros Act (“the Act”) in 1971.9 Since its enactment, however, the Act 
has provoked litigation by advocates on behalf of these “living symbols of the 
historic and pioneer spirit.”10 
Spurred by the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) controversial man-
agement decisions and its preference of livestock grazing interests,11 wild 
horse enthusiasts and animal welfare activists view the BLM’s actions with 
skepticism.12 Although horse advocates have in recent years brought suit chal-
lenging the BLM’s management decisions, they have faced difficulties getting 
                                                                                                                           
 5 Id. (“Congress appropriated $74.9 million to the Wild Horse and Burro Program in Fiscal Year 
2012, which ended September 30, 2012. Of that year’s expenditures ($72.4 million) holding costs 
accounted for $43 million.”). 
 6 DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MUSTANG COUNTRY: WILD HORSES AND BURROS 6 (undated), available 
at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/nv/field_offices/winnemucca_field_office/programs/
wild_horse___burro.Par.75828.File.dat/Mustang_Country_final070313_ver3.pdf and http://perma.cc/
AV7E-WQCD. 
 7 Kristen H. Glover, Managing Wild Horses on Public Lands: Congressional Action and Agency 
Response, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1108, 1108–09 & 1108 n.2 (2001); Kenneth P. Pitt, The Wild and Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act: A Western Melodrama, 15 ENVTL. L. 503, 504–05 (1985). 
 8 Iraola, supra note 2, at 1050. 
 9 Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 10 See id.; Glover, supra note 7, at 1108–09 (“This seemingly benevolent legislation and the Bu-
reau of Land Management’s (BLM) implementation of the Act have led to more than forty suits in the 
federal district courts.”). 
 11 Joseph M. Feller, What Is Wrong with the BLM’s Management of Livestock Grazing on the 
Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 556–57 (1993–1994) (describing how critics of the BLM “ar-
gue that little has changed on the ground and that the Bureau’s managers still place the interests of 
livestock operators above environmental values”); Andrew Cohen, All the Pretty Horses: Ken Salazar 
to Leave Interior, ATLANTIC (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/01/all-
the-pretty-horses-ken-salazar-to-leave-interior/267234/, available at http://perma.cc/WUF5-4RJS 
(explaining that there exist “legitimate disagreements about how much damage wild horses do to the 
public lands upon which they graze, especially when compared to the damage that cattle and sheep do 
to the land”). 
 12 See In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 
2012) (challenging the legality of a wild horse gather in light of the Act and the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA)); Colo. Wild Horse & Burro Coal. v. Salazar, 890 F. Supp. 2d 99, 99 (D.D.C. 
2012) (challenging the legality of a BLM wild horse roundup in Colorado); Habitat for Horses v. 
Salazar, No. 10 Civ. 7684 (WHP), 2011 WL 4343306, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2011) (challenging the 
BLM’s gather of horses in violation of the Act, Administrative Procedure Act, and NEPA). 
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their cases heard on the merits.13 As a result, controversies surrounding wild 
horse management persist and further inflame passions.14 
This Note argues that if the issue arises, the Supreme Court should hear 
the wild horse dispute to resolve a potential circuit split in wild horse litigation 
to resolve longstanding confusion in standing causation.15 Part I presents an 
overview of the BLM’s management of wild horse populations.16 Part II ad-
dresses the evolution of general standing jurisprudence and proposed solutions 
to ambiguities in standing causation in particular.17 Part III discusses activists’ 
struggles regarding the standing doctrine and highlights a potential circuit split 
regarding the causation requirement within standing (“standing causation”).18 
Finally, Part IV argues that this potential circuit split presents an appropriate 
opportunity for the Court to clarify what plaintiffs must show to prove causa-
tion by adopting tort law proximate cause analysis.19 In this way, the Court 
would encourage efficiency and predictability while promoting standing’s 
gatekeeper function and separation of powers.20 Importantly, this clarification 
would benefit wild horse and environmental advocates alike by enhancing 
their ability to weigh the benefits of pursuing costly litigation.21 
I. FEDERAL MANAGEMENT OF THE AMERICAN WILD HORSE 
A. Raising Awareness 
Advocates first expressed concern over the treatment of wild horses in the 
1950s when horse meat became commercially valuable.22 Initially, advocates 
were most alarmed by the inhumane practices involved in commercial horse 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Colo. Wild Horse & Burro Coal., 890 F. Supp. 2d at 100, 103 (holding the organization’s 
challenge not ripe for review); In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 713 F. Supp. 2d 20, 29 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(finding no standing because the plaintiffs failed to establish causation); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. 
U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 14 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding plaintiff’s NEPA claim against 
the BLM moot); Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 409 
(2010) (defining “on the merits” as being resolved on the basis of law and facts). 
 14 Pitt, supra note 7, at 504–05. 
 15 See infra notes 204–260 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 22–80 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 81–163 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 164–204 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing, 80 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1241, 1241 (2011) (“Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never clearly established the 
conceptual analysis necessary for making the causation determination within standing law.”); infra 
notes 204–260 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 209–235 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Pitt, supra note 7, at 506 (“Commercial hunters systematically rounded up wild horses and 
burros and sold the animals to slaughterhouses for processing.”). 
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hunting.23 Using low flying planes and mounted armed cowboys, commercial 
contractors rounded up horses and reduced their numbers on the range.24 The 
cowboys would then tie the captured horses to large truck tires to make them 
easier for handling.25 En route to the slaughterhouses, the horses were packed 
into trucks so that only their weight supported them upright.26 The practice of 
horse hunting alone reduced the wild horse population from two million to an 
estimated 25,000.27 
By the late 1950s, the work of activists had gained traction.28 In 1959, 
President Eisenhower signed the Wild Horse Annie29Act, which banned the use 
of aircraft or motor vehicles for commercial hunting on public lands.30 Ulti-
mately, the law failed to provide adequate protection.31 The compounding lack 
of enforcement by local officials rendered the law ineffective, and the wild 
horse population decreased further to an estimated 9500.32 
Other attempts to introduce bills protecting wild horses were met with 
opposition from livestock interest holders.33 The encouragement from activists, 
humane societies, and school children, however, drove Congress to continue 
pushing for new protective measures.34 Finally, a consolidated measure passed 
both the Senate and the House as the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros 
Act (“the Act”).35 President Nixon signed the Act into law on December 15, 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Velma B. Johnston, The Fight to Save a Memory, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1972). 
 28 See Pitt, supra note 7, at 506 (“[S]upport developed throughout the United States to stop the 
brutal and inhumane treatment of captured wild horses.”). 
 29 History and Facts, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/whb
program-/history_and_facts.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/65GH-
ZDBJ (“The mid-20th century harvesting of wild horses for commercial purposes induced a Reno, 
Nevada, secretary—Velma Johnston—to begin a campaign that led to passage of a 1959 law to protect 
these iconic animals . . . . The campaign became known as the ‘Pencil War’ and Ms. Johnston was 
affectionately dubbed ‘Wild Horse Annie.’”). 
 30 Wild Horse Annie Act of 1959, 18 U.S.C. § 47 (“Whoever uses an aircraft or a motor vehicle 
to hunt, for the purpose of capturing or killing, any wild unbranded horse, mare, colt, or burro running 
at large on any of the public land or ranges shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 
six months, or both.”); Pitt, supra note 7, at 506–07. 
 31 Pitt, supra note 7, at 506–07 (“[The law] did not protect them from roundups on private lands, 
from further encroachment upon their habitat, from target shooters, or from non-motorized roundups 
on public lands.”). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. (explaining that livestock interest holders specifically opposed prohibitions against com-
mercial processing of those wild horses exceeding range capacity and the release of domestic horses 
and burros). 
 34 Id. 
 35 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1333 (2012); Pitt, supra note 7, at 507–08. 
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1971.36 The Act expanded the BLM’s jurisdiction to include wild horses.37 It 
further provided that wild horses “are to be considered . . . an integral part of 
the natural system of the public lands.”38 
B. Overview of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act 
The Act protects wild free-roaming horses and burros on public lands 
from “capture, branding, harassment, or death.”39 Congress passed the Act un-
der the Property Clause in Article IV of the Constitution.40 The Act brings all 
free-roaming horses and burros under the jurisdiction of the Department of the 
Interior and the Department of Agriculture.41 Together, these departments and 
their respective agencies oversee the management and protection of wild hors-
es and burros roaming on public lands.42 
The Act specifically authorizes the Secretary43 to protect wild free-
roaming horses and burros as “components of the public land.”44 Ultimately, 
the Secretary must manage wild horse populations “in a manner that is de-
signed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the 
public lands.”45 The Act requires the Secretary to conduct “[a]ll management 
activities . . . at the minimal feasible level . . . in consultation with” state wild-
life agencies and advisory boards.46 
To that end, the Secretary “may designate and maintain specific ranges on 
public lands as sanctuaries for [wild horse] protection and preservation.”47 The 
BLM in particular maintains specific ranges by setting appropriate manage-
                                                                                                                           
 36 Statement on Signing Bill to Protect Wild Horses and Burros, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1193 (Dec. 17, 
1971). 
 37 16 U.S.C. § 1333; Glover, supra note 7, at 1109. 
 38 16 U.S.C. § 1331; Glover, supra note 7, at 1110. 
 39 16 U.S.C. § 1331. The Act defines horses as wild when they are “unbranded and unclaimed 
horses and burros on public lands of the United States.” Id. § 1332(b). 
 40 Iraola, supra note 2, at 1051; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have 
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.”). 
 41 16 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1332(e), 1333 (2012); Iraola, supra note 2, at 1051–52 (explaining that 
Act vests authority to the Department of the Interior (through the Bureau of Land Management) and 
the Department of Agriculture). 
 42 Iraola, supra note 2, at 1052. 
 43 16 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (defining “Secretary” as the Secretaries of the Department of the Interior 
and the Department of Agriculture). 
 44 Id. § 1333(a); Iraola, supra note 2, at 1052. 
 45 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a). “The ecosystems of public rangelands are not able to withstand the im-
pacts from overpopulated herds, which include soil erosion, sedimentation of streams, and damage to 
wildlife habitat.” Wild Horse and Burro Quick Facts, supra note 4. 
 46 16 U.S.C. §§ 1333(a), 1337; Iraola, supra note 2, at 1052. 
 47 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2012). 
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ment levels (“AMLs”) within herd management areas (“HMAs”).48 AMLs are 
based on the number of wild horses that a particular area can support.49 AMLs 
are specifically designed to prevent deterioration of the ecological balance, 
pursuant to the purpose of the statute.50 The Secretary maintains current inven-
tories of wild horse populations to determine whether overpopulation exists.51 
If the Secretary determines that overpopulation exists and that action is 
necessary to remove “excess”52 animals, the Act explicitly prescribes three or-
dered steps.53 First, the Secretary must destroy “old, sick, or lame animals . . . in 
the most humane manner possible.”54 Next, the Secretary must place healthy 
excess animals under “private maintenance and care.”55 Finally, to the extent that 
healthy animals have been removed and are not in demand for adoption, the Sec-
retary must destroy those remaining excess animals “in the most humane and 
cost efficient manner possible.”56 In 2004, the Burns Amendment authorized the 
BLM to sell, “without limitation,” healthy animals that have been removed and 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. § 1333(b)(1); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: IM-
PROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FEDERAL WILD HORSE PROGRAM 51 (1990), available at http://www.
gao.gov/assets/150/149472.pdf and http://perma.cc/T9XN-CBU9; Herd Areas and Herd Management 
Areas, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/ca/st/en/prog/wild_horse_and_burro/hma-
main.html (last updated Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/8QG8-MEMA (“HMAs are 
those areas . . . where the decision has been made, through Land Use Plans, to manage for populations 
of wild horses and/or burros.”). 
 49 Battle Mountain Wild Horse & Burro Program, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., (last updated Mar. 25, 
2011) http://www.blm.gov/nv/st/en/fo/battle_mountain_field/blm_programs/wild_horse_and_burro.html, 
available at http://perma.cc/59P6-L9VV; see 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1). 
 50 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a), (b)(1). 
 51 Id. § 1333(b)(1); Battle Mountain Wild Horse & Burro Program, supra note 49 (“The Wild 
Horse and Burro Specialists conduct census work using helicopters or airplanes to monitor and inven-
tory the wild horse populations on an ongoing basis (about every 2–4 years). When it is determined 
that the population in a HMA has exceeded the AML, a gather is planned for that area to remove ex-
cess wild horses or burros.”). 
 52 16 U.S.C. § 1332(f)(1)–(2) (defining excess animals as wild horses and burros “which have 
been removed” or “which must be removed from an area in order to preserve and maintain a thriving 
natural ecological balance and multiple-use relationship in that area”). 
 53 Id. § 1333(b)(2) (instructing BLM to immediately remove excess animals in a specified order); 
Iraola, supra note 2, at 1053–54. 
 54 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 55 Id. § 1333(b)(2)(B); see Iraola, supra note 2, at 1054 (“Private maintenance is accomplished 
through an adoption program, which contemplates adopters who are both ‘qualified individuals,’ and 
also persons who ‘can assure humane treatment and care . . .’ of these animals.”). 
 56 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2)(C). 
2014] Standing Causation and the Freedom of an American Icon 405 
are not in demand for adoption.57 The proceeds of these sales fund the adoption 
program.58 
C. The BLM’s Controversial Use of Long-Term Holding Facilities 
 As of 2013, the BLM managed approximately 37,300 wild horses and 
burros across ten western states.59 Notably, as of January 2014 the BLM has 
decreased the acreage allotted to wild horses from 53.8 million acres to 31.6 
million acres since the time of the Act’s enactment.60 A recent estimate of the 
free-roaming population exceeds the maximum total AML by approximately 
14,000.61 To reach target AMLs in HMAs, the BLM conducts “gathers” to re-
move excess animals.62 From 1971 to 2007, the BLM removed more than 
267,000 wild horses and burros.63 
Immediately after a gather, the BLM places excess horses in temporary 
holding facilities for sorting.64 In these facilities, the horses are either prepared 
for adoption or sale, or transferred to short- or long-term holding facilities 
where they will most likely live out the remainder of their lives.65 The BLM’s 
stated preference is that healthy animals removed from the range be adopted 
through the BLM’s Adopt-a-Horse-or-Burro Program.66 Since 1971, qualified 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 142(a)(2), 118 Stat. 2809, 
3070–71 (2005) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1333); Iraola, supra note 2, at 1054; Wild Horse and Burro 
Quick Facts, supra note 4 (“[The Burns Amendment] directs the BLM to sell ‘without limitation’ to 
any willing buyers animals that are either more than 10 years old or have been passed over for adop-
tion at least three times.”). 
 58 16 U.S.C. § 1333(e)(3)(B) (“Funds generated from the sale of excess animals under this sub-
section shall be (A) credited as an offsetting collection to the Management of Lands and Resources 
appropriation for the Bureau of Land Management; and (B) used for the costs relating to the adoption 
of wild free-roaming horses and burros, including the costs of marketing such adoption.”). 
 59 Wild Horse and Burro Quick Facts, supra note 4 (citing the latest census at 33,780 horses and 
6825 burros). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. (“The maximum appropriate management level (AML) is approximately 26,677.”). 
 62 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (2012); National Wild Horse and Burro Tentative Gather/Remove/
Treat Schedule Fiscal Year 2014, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/whb
program/herd_management/tentative_gather_schedule.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2013), available at 
http://perma.cc/L9CM-B8CR. 
 63 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT: EFFECTIVE LONG-
TERM OPTIONS NEEDED TO MANAGE UNADOPTABLE WILD HORSES 3 (2008), available at http://
www.gao.gov/assets/290/282664.pdf and http://perma.cc/7QDK-5MT5. 
 64 See id. at 19 & n.22 (“When gathers are conducted, an emphasis is placed on removing the 
younger, more adoptable animals from the range.”); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 
48, at 36 (“Potential adopters generally prefer horses younger than 5 years of age because of the diffi-
culty in changing the behavior of older horses.”). 
 65 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 63, at 3, 19. 
 66 Id. at 3. 
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individuals have successfully adopted more than 230,000 horses and burros 
from the BLM.67 
Because the number of horses removed far exceeds the number of horses 
adopted, the unadopted horses are transferred to longer term holding facili-
ties.68 The BLM manages the holding facilities, which are located on both 
government and private lands.69 Due in part to decreasing adoption rates,70 the 
holding facility populations have swelled.71 In 2001, the BLM’s holding facili-
ties housed 9,807 animals.72 By June 2008, the number of animals held in short 
and long-term holding facilities reached close to 31,000.73 A study in 2013 
found that there are more than 50,000 wild horses and burros living off the 
range in short-term and long-term care.74 At the same time, the cost of care per 
horse in both short-and long-term holding facilities has increased.75 Despite 
warnings from the Government Accountability Office and the Department of 
the Interior’s Office of Inspector General about the potential for escalating 
holding costs, the BLM’s spending on long-term holding alone increased from 
roughly $668,000 to more than $9.1 million from 2000 to 2007.76 In 2012, to-
tal holding costs accounted for roughly sixty percent of the BLM’s entire 
budget for the Wild Horse and Burro program.77 
Thus, the BLM’s management budget is strained by rising costs associat-
ed with holding facilities.78 As a result, the BLM currently faces criticism from 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Wild Horse and Burro Quick Facts, supra note 4. 
 68 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 63, at 40 (“Since 2001, about 74,000 
animals have been removed from the range, while only about 46,400 have been adopted or sold.”). 
 69 Id. at 50 (“BLM’s short-term holding facilities are mostly maintained and directly managed by 
BLM, either on government property or on leased property. Several are at state prisons, and a few 
others are maintained by contractors in privately-owned feedlots or ranches that BLM has leased.”); 
see id. at 45 (“BLM pays private contractors an average of $1.27 per horse per day to maintain the 
animals for the remainder of their lifespan, unless removed from long-term holding for adoption or 
sale.”). 
 70 Id. at 8 (“Thirty-six percent fewer wild horses and burros were adopted in 2007, compared to 
average adoption rates in the 1990s. BLM officials attribute the steady adoption decline in recent 
years to the decreasing demand for horses in general and increasing hay and fuel costs associated with 
their care.”). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Wild Horse and Burro Quick Facts, supra note 4. 
 75 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 48, at 43. The average cost per animal in 
short-term holding increased from $3.00 to $5.08 per day from 2001 to 2008. Id. Long-term holding 
costs have similarly increased from $1.22 to $1.28 from 2001 to 2008. Id. at 45 & n.41. 
 76 Id. at 8, 45. 
 77 See Wild Horse and Burro Quick Facts, supra note 4. 
 78 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 63, at 56 (describing that rising costs 
associated with short- and long-term holding facilities “leaves a smaller portion of the BLM’s budget 
to go towards on the range management activities”); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 
48, at 40. (“[W]hile private sanctuaries offer humane disposal of unadoptable horses, rising costs and 
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both the media and environmental conservation groups for mismanaging its 
budget.79 Advocates are also increasingly alarmed with the BLM’s manage-
ment of horse welfare conditions within the holding facilities.80 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF STANDING JURISPRUDENCE 
Since the enactment of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burro Act 
(“the Act”), the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) execution of its statuto-
ry directive has provoked litigation on a number of issues.81 The most recent 
cases challenge the BLM’s use of long-term holding facilities and have led to a 
potential circuit split regarding plaintiff standing.82 This potential split is at-
tributed to ambiguities surrounding the constitutional standing requirements, 
and specifically the causation prong of the three-part test in Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife.83 
A. Introduction to the Standing Doctrine 
Before hearing the merits of a case, a federal court must assure itself that 
it has subject matter jurisdiction.84 The standing doctrine provides jurisdiction 
by requiring that federal courts assess whether a plaintiff has a genuine interest 
                                                                                                                           
the probable need for a long-term commitment of federal resources will require BLM to seek alterna-
tive disposal options for unadoptable wild horses removed from public rangeland.”). 
 79 See Andrew Cohen, 7 Questions About Wild Horses for Interior Secretary Nominee Sally Jew-
ell, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/7-questions-
about-wild-horses-for-interior-secretary-nominee-sally-jewell/273706/, available at http://perma.cc/
7DR4-MTQE (“We all know that the current situation with the corralled wild horses is unsustainable 
as an economic or political policy.”). 
 80 Id. (“In addition to the economic burden to taxpayers of the roundup and corralling of all these 
horses, horse advocates are growing increasingly concerned about the conditions many of the captured 
horses live in.”). 
 81 Iraola, supra note 2, at 1055; e.g., In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 909 F. 
Supp. 2d 1178, 1194 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (challenging the BLM’s use of holding facilities as illegal under 
the Act); Colo. Wild Horse & Burro Coal. v. Salazar, 639 F. Supp. 2d 87, 87 (D.D.C. 2009) (challeng-
ing BLM’s decision to remove all wild horses from a particular area); Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. 
Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. 1206, 1215–16 (D. Nev. 1975) (challenging the BLM’s roundup of wild horses 
as illegal under the National Environmental Policy Act for lack of an environmental impact state-
ment). 
 82 See infra notes 160–202 and accompanying text. 
 83 See 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); infra notes 95–115 and accompanying text. 
 84 See FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (“[E]very federal appellate court 
has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower 
courts in a cause under review’ . . .”) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 
541 (1986)) (alteration in original); see also Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as a 
New Issue on Appeal: Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (defining subject matter 
jurisdiction as “the authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in an action”). 
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and stake in a case.85 Being heard on the merits implies that a case was re-
solved accurately based on law and fact as opposed to a procedural technicali-
ty.86 In this way, by serving as a gatekeeper to litigation,87 standing serves to 
promote judicial efficiency88 while also supporting separation of powers.89 By 
requiring that courts issue rulings only when faced with actual controversies 
between adverse parties, each with a personal stake in the outcome, standing 
also serves to improve the overall quality in judicial decisionmaking.90 
The doctrine of standing has two components: constitutional and pruden-
tial requirements.91 The constitutional standing doctrine is rooted in the “Case 
and Controversy” clause of Article III of the Constitution.92 Because the con-
stitutional standing doctrine is rooted in the Constitution, its requirements may 
not be waived or modified by Congress.93 
Unlike constitutional standing, prudential standing is not rooted in the 
Constitution and is not strictly enforceable.94 Under the prudential standing 
doctrine, a plaintiff must show that his or her injury is within a zone of interest 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Bradford C. Mank, Informational Standing After Summers, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
1, 7 (2012) (“Federal courts only have jurisdiction over a case if a plaintiff has standing for the relief 
sought.”). 
 86 See Tidmarsh, supra note 13, at 409 (“[R]esolving cases on the merits meant removing proce-
dural barriers that stood in the way of the resolution demanded by substantive law and justice.”) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
 87 Meier, supra note 19, at 1245. “The first understanding of threshold means only that jurisdic-
tional issues such as standing must be decided before other issues in a lawsuit.” Id. at 1268. 
 88 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (“This requirement assures that ‘there 
is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the complain-
ing party.’”) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221 (1974)); 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environ-
mental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (“[S]tanding improves efficiency by allo-
cating scarce judicial resources to the most pressing cases.”). 
 89 Summers, 555 U.S. at 493 (reasoning that where the need to exercise judicial review “does not 
exist, allowing courts to oversee legislative or executive action would significantly alter the allocation 
of power . . . away from a democratic form of government”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Mank, supra note 85, at 7–8; Pushaw, supra note 88, at 23 (“The Court also declared that its approach 
to standing promoted the Constitution’s original separation-of-powers design, because in our democ-
racy the Judiciary had a uniquely limited role vis-a-vis the political branches.”). 
 90 Baker v. Carr, 309 U.S. 186, 204 (1961); Pushaw, supra note 88, at 3 (contrasting concrete 
disputes between adverse parties with “mere intellectual or ideological interest in the law”). 
 91 Blake R. Bertagna, Comment, “Standing” Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs to 
Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 415, 
419. This Note focuses exclusively on constitutional standing. 
 92 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . to Controversies 
. . . .”); Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose 
Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 556 (2012). 
 93 Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 727, 732 (2009) (ex-
plaining that Congress may not waive the constitutional standing requirement). 
 94 Id. (explaining that “[t]he prudential requirements are merely ‘judicially self-imposed limits’ 
that are waivable by Congress”) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
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that the statute or constitutional provision serves to protect.95 Prudential stand-
ing also specifically prohibits plaintiffs from asserting generalized grievances 
or third-party legal rights.96 
B. The Modern Constitutional Standing Doctrine 
The requirements within constitutional standing are discussed in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife.97 In Lujan, the Supreme Court in 1992 considered 
whether plaintiffs lacked legal standing to challenge a regulation enacted by 
the government under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).98 Section 7(a)(2) of 
the ESA provides that a federal agency must carry out its functions without 
threatening any endangered species.99 In 1978, the Department of the Interior 
had promulgated a regulation applying the provisions of that pertinent section 
to foreign nations.100 A few years later, however, the Department revised the 
promulgation to apply only to actions taken in the United States or on the high 
seas.101 Defenders of Wildlife (“Defenders”) challenged this narrowing and 
sought to restore the initial regulation’s equal application globally.102 
 In evaluating these members’ standing, the Court articulated the modern 
standing test.103 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact “which 
is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.”104 Second, the plaintiff must assert “a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of.”105 Specifically, the injury 
must be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 155 (1997) (holding that the zone of interest test “requires that 
a plaintiff’s grievance arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory 
provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit”); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970) (implicitly applying the zone of interest test to find prudential stand-
ing). 
 96 See Sohn, supra note 93, at 728, 732. Generalized grievances is “a term used to refer to suits 
involving large segments of the public, or those where a citizen lacking a personal injury seeks to 
force the government to obey a duly enacted law.” Mank, supra note 85, at 9. 
 97 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 98 Id. at 557–58; Bertagna, supra note 91, at 421. 
 99 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012) (“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the 
assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by 
such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which 
is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.”); 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558. 
 100 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558. 
 101 Id. at 558–59. 
 102 Id. at 559. 
 103 Id. at 560–61; Bertagna, supra note 91, at 421. 
 104 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105 See id. 
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not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before 
the court.”106 Third, it must be “likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.”107 The party bringing suit bears the burden of establishing 
these three elements.108 In Lujan, the Defenders relied on the aesthetic and rec-
reational injury of two of their members to prove standing.109 Applying this 
three-part test to the facts, the Court held that it could not proceed to the merits 
of the case because the members did not meet the imminent injury require-
ment.110    
Thus, the modern constitutional standing doctrine provides for three con-
stitutional requirements, without which a court will refuse to consider the mer-
its of a case.111 First, the litigant must demonstrate an injury in fact.112 Second, 
the injury must also be “fairly traceable” to the defendant.113 Third, the litigant 
must show that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision by a 
court.114 
C. Scholarly Review of Standing Doctrine Clarity 
1. Ambiguities in Standing Causation Despite an Articulated Test 
Although an articulated test for constitutional standing exists, the Su-
preme Court has varied its construction and interpretation of the various re-
quirements.115 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on standing has often been 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separa-
tion of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37, 45 (“[C]ausation was first expressly recognized as an 
article III requirement in the 1973 decision of Linda R.S. v. Richard D.”); Meier, supra note 19, at 
1253 (attributing the requirement of “fairly traceable” to Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 
(1973)). 
 107 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 108 See id. (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these ele-
ments.”). 
 109 See id. at 562–64; Bertagna, supra note 91, at 421. One member asserted that she would suffer 
harm from a federal project that would endanger the Nile crocodile’s habit and her ability to observe 
the creatures in their natural habitat. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563. The second member alleged injury from a 
federal project that threatened the habitat of endangered species such as the Asian elephant and the 
leopard. Id. 
 110 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564; Bertagna, supra note 91 at 421–22 (“The Court could not see how 
damage to a species so remote in location from the two members would cause them imminent injury. 
This finding was bolstered by the member’s lack of ‘concrete plans’ to return to the actual locations in 
the near future.”). 
 111 Elliott, supra note 92, at 556. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Pushaw, supra note 88, at 49 (“The injury, causation, and redressability standards are hope-
lessly vague, despite the Court’s efforts to make them sound clear and objective.”); Joshua E. Gard-
ner, Note, At the Intersection of Constitutional Standing, Congressional Citizen-Suits, and the Hu-
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criticized for suffering from “inconsistency, unreliability and inordinate com-
plexity.”116 For these reasons, the standing doctrine has been called largely dis-
cretionary with little foundation in Article III’s history, text, or structure.117 
The variation in interpretation and application explains why the standing doc-
trine is considered “one of the most amorphous concepts in the entire doctrine 
of public law.”118 
Legal scholars in particular have widely criticized the standing doctrine 
for its ambiguity.119 Their criticism, however, has focused primarily on the first 
prong of injury and has left the second prong of causation generally ignored.120 
Due in part to this academic disinterest, the analysis involved in the causation 
inquiry remains unclear.121 The Supreme Court has not provided helpful guid-
ance on the precise analysis involved in the causation prong of standing.122 
Indeed, the Court’s “fairly traceable” language provides little concrete guid-
ance.123 
This lack of consistency in the Court’s standing causation jurisprudence is 
compounded by the Court’s reluctance to tackle politically contentious is-
sues.124 For example, in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Court was forced to deal with a political controversy surrounding climate 
                                                                                                                           
mane Treatment of Animals: Proposals to Strengthen the Animal Welfare Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
330, 338–39 (2000). 
 116 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.2, 
at 7 (3d ed. 1994); compare Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738–39 (1972) (limiting the previ-
ous understanding of aesthetic and recreational injury by holding that an organization’s assertion of 
interest is insufficient to establish standing unless accompanied by an individual member’s injury in 
fact), with United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688–
90 (1973) (distinguishing the holding of Sierra Club to find that a group of law students had standing 
because the potential for environmental damage in the Washington D.C. area was a “specific and 
perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens who has not used the natural resources”). 
 117 Pushaw, supra note 88, at 8, 105. 
 118 Elliott, supra note 92, at 558 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)). 
 119 Meier, supra note 19, at 1243; Pushaw, supra note 88, at 105 (suggesting “refinements of the 
existing elements of standing to make them clearer, better grounded in Article III’s text and history.”). 
 120 Meier, supra note 19, at 1243–44. 
 121 Id. at 1244. 
 122 Id. at 1245 (“[T]he actual analysis employed by the Court under this element of standing is far 
less clear.”); Pushaw, supra note 88, at 51 (contrasting two cases to show courts’ varying interpreta-
tion of causation). 
 123 Meier, supra note 19, at 1248 (explaining that the Supreme Court has had difficulties “in de-
veloping the fairly traceable requirement of standing”); id. at 1252 (arguing that “the Court would be 
hard-pressed to pick a term that could better obfuscate”); Pushaw, supra note 88, at 38 (explaining 
that that the “Court further confused Article III standing analysis by adding the requirements that the 
injury must be ‘fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be re-
dressed by the requested relief’”) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751). 
 124 See Meier, supra note 19, at 1296. 
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change.125 Massachusetts alleged that greenhouse gases (GHG) contributed to 
rising sea levels and that the EPA’s refusal to regulate GHGs threatened state-
owned coastal land.126 The Court found that Massachusetts asserted a suffi-
cient injury because the state was losing coastal lands to rising seas.127 Turning 
to causation, the Court acknowledged that the EPA’s failure contributed to 
Massachusetts’s injury.128 The Court sidestepped a causation analysis, howev-
er, by relying on the EPA’s stipulation as to a causal link between GHG emis-
sions and global warming.129 Finally, the Court found that that the plaintiffs 
met the redressability requirement because ordering the EPA to regulate GHG 
emissions would provide relief.130 
2. Tort Law as a Suggested Approach 
In contemplating the appropriate remedy for ambiguities surrounding 
standing causation, some academics argue that tort law serves as a “perfect 
springboard” for discussion.131 Tort law provides relief for those who have 
been injured by the actions of others.132 A successful tort claim requires proof 
of the defendant’s duty to the victim, and proof that the defendant’s action 
breached the duty and caused an actual injury to the victim.133 In tort law, cau-
sation guides a court’s understanding of fair compensation and distribution.134 
The tort law causation inquiry consists of a two-part framework.135 First, a 
                                                                                                                           
 125 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007); Meier, supra note 19, at 1296 (“Obviously, global warming is 
one of the more contentious contemporary issues in American politics. One understands why the 
Court desired to avoid the issue and thus eagerly grasped onto the stipulation made by the EPA.”). 
 126 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 504–05, 522 (“According to petitioners’ 
unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 
20th century as a result of global warming. These rising seas have already begun to swallow Massa-
chusetts’ coastal land.”) (citations omitted). 
 127 Id. at 521–23. 
 128 Id. at 523. 
 129 Id.; Meier, supra note 19, at 1296 (“Turning to causation, the Court ducked some of the in-
credibly difficult cause in fact hurdles inherent in linking the EPA’s alleged misconduct to the plain-
tiff’s harm by accepting the EPA’s stipulation.”). 
 130 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 526 (“The risk of catastrophic harm, though 
remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the 
relief they seek.”). 
 131 Meier, supra note 19, at 1246. 
 132 Philip Desai, Note, Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.: The Best Approach to Satisfying the 
Injury Requirement in Medical Monitoring Claims, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 95, 97 (2011). 
 133 Id. at 97–98 (“The four elements for a successful tort claim are known as duty, breach, causa-
tion, and actual loss or damage.”). 
 134 Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 643, 646 (2001) (“Causation is the key that turns the lock on a host of other issues—
compensation, fairness, distribution, and incentive creation—that have long animated the law of 
tort.”). 
 135 Meier, supra note 19, at 1247. 
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court must ask whether the defendant’s conduct was a “cause in fact” for the 
harm.136 Next, if appropriate, a court may consider whether the defendant’s 
conduct was a “proximate cause.”137 
A cause in fact inquiry turns on the “but-for” test.138 In tort law, if the 
plaintiff’s damages would have occurred even if the defendant had not acted in 
a negligent manner, then the defendant’s actions are not a cause in fact of the 
plaintiff’s damages, and the defendant is not liable.139 This type of causal in-
quiry is fact-intensive140 and consistent with a notion of retributive compensa-
tion.141 The inquiry addresses whether the defendant’s misconduct is responsi-
ble for the plaintiff’s injury.142 
The proximate cause inquiry, on the other hand, assumes that the defend-
ant’s conduct was a cause in fact of the injury.143 A court applies the proximate 
cause analysis when considering the fairness of holding the defendant respon-
sible for the injury.144 Proximate cause concedes that there are infinite conse-
quences arising from every act.145 When invoking proximate cause analysis, 
courts often use one of two tests, “foreseeability” and “scope of the risk.”146 
Both of these tests ask whether the plaintiff’s injury is one of the foreseeable 
consequences that render the defendant’s conduct inherently unreasonable or 
illegal.147 
Advocates of the tort law approach to standing causation argue that cause 
in fact and proximate cause analysis should be applied to resolve confusion 
surrounding the requirement.148 According to their theory, the word “traceable” 
                                                                                                                           
 136 Id.; David F. Partlett, Symposium: A Tribute to David Fisher, 73 MO. L. REV. 281, 282 (2008) 
(explaining that the cause in fact analysis is only the beginning of the two-part framework). 
 137 See Meier, supra note 19, at 1249 (explaining that proximate cause assumes that the defend-
ant’s actions are a cause in fact, and asks whether the defendant “should nevertheless be shielded from 
liability”). 
 138 Id. at 1247 (explaining that the cause in fact requirement turns on a but for test: “But for the 
defendant’s negligent behavior, would the plaintiff’s damages have occurred?”). 
 139 See id. at 1247–48. 
 140 Id. at 1245. 
 141 Id. at 1248 (explaining that one of tort law’s primary objectives is to compensate those who 
have been harmed by the blameworthy conduct of others, and that cause in fact analysis establishes 
that link through the but for test). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 1249. 
 144 Id. “[P]roximate cause serves a limiting function within Negligence law.” Id. at 1278. 
 145 Id. at 1249–50. 
 146 Id. at 1250. 
 147 Id. at 1250, 1278. 
 148 Id. at 1241. 
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inherently connotes a cause in fact inquiry.149 Alternatively, “fairly” suggests a 
proximate cause inquiry.150 
Under this theory, a court would apply cause in fact and proximate cause 
analysis to establish standing causation.151 Applying proximate cause to stand-
ing cases involving statutory violations requires an understanding of legislative 
intent.152 Specifically, a court would consider the purpose of the law at issue 
and the sort of harms that the law seeks to prevent.153 Ultimately, proximate 
cause is a fairness analysis, and a court is guided by public policy considera-
tions.154 
Advocates of this theory argue that a careful reading of the Supreme 
Court’s standing jurisprudence reveals that the Court has often applied a prox-
imate cause inquiry despite its suggestion of cause in fact analysis.155 They 
argue, for example, that although the Court in Linda R.S. v. Richard D. sug-
gested a cause in fact inquiry, the Court actually invoked proximate cause rea-
soning.156 In Linda R.S., a mother sued the state of Texas and a Dallas County 
District Attorney under the Equal Protection Clause.157 Specifically, she argued 
that a Texas state policy of not prosecuting fathers for failing to pay child sup-
port was unconstitutional.158 The Court held that the plaintiff had failed to es-
tablish a sufficient causal link between the plaintiff’s injury, stemming from 
the father’s failure to pay, and the state’s alleged Equal Protection violation in 
                                                                                                                           
 149 Id. at 1252 (“A fundamental aspect of [traceability] is that it involves a connection between 
two things or ideas. As has already been discussed, cause in fact connects the defendant’s inappropri-
ate behavior with the plaintiff’s injury.”). 
 150 Id. at 1252–53 (“An important consideration in the decision to impose liability is fairness to 
the actor.”). 
 151 See id. at 1245. 
 152 Id. at 1280. 
 153 Id. (“To apply a proximate cause analysis in a case involving a statute or an administrative 
regulation requires an understanding of the reasons the issuing body created that law and the types of 
injuries that it intended to address.”). 
 154 Rory Bahadur, Almost a Century and Three Restatements After Green It’s Time to Admit and 
Remedy the Nonsense of Negligence, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 61, 75–76 (2011). 
 155 Meier, supra note 19, at 1282 (“In early cases after the introduction of the fairly traceable 
prong of standing, the Court would often use cause in fact language, but perform a proximate cause 
analysis.”). 
 156 410 U.S. at 618–19 (holding that a citizen’s standing was guided by the policy underlying the 
court’s previous decisions); Meier, supra note 19, at 1258 (explaining that in Linda R.S., “Justice 
Marshall’s conclusion that the plaintiff is without standing is based on an implicit understanding about 
the types of harms against which the Equal Protection Clause protects,” which is proximate cause 
reasoning). 
 157 410 U.S. at 614–15, 616. 
 158 Id. at 615–16. 
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enforcing the child support regime only on behalf of children not born out of 
wedlock.159 
In rejecting that the Linda R.S. decision was based on cause in fact analy-
sis, tort law scholars point to the evidence that would have been required for 
such an inherently fact-intensive inquiry, but was not a part of the Court’s rea-
soning.160 Because fact-intensive evidence is not present at the outset of litiga-
tion, scholars argue this renders cause in fact analysis incompatible with stand-
ing’s gatekeeper function.161 Instead, scholars argue that the Court’s analysis 
was driven by an implicit concern with the underlying purpose of the Equal 
Protection Clause, suggesting that a proximate cause inquiry was actually ap-
plied.162 In deferring to the underlying purpose of the statute or clause, applica-
tion of proximate cause analysis also serves to promote the separation of pow-
ers.163 
III. A POTENTIAL CIRCUIT SPLIT ON STANDING CAUSATION  
IN THE WILD HORSE DISPUTE 
The Supreme Court considers and resolves major standing issues infre-
quently.164 Although Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife articulated a three-part 
standing test, the Court has yet to tackle standing causation explicitly.165 Re-
turning to the wild horse cause, the ambiguity surrounding standing causation 
analysis has recently led to a potential circuit split on the issue.166 
A. Eastern District of California: Finding Sufficient Standing Causation 
In 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in In 
Defense of Animals v. U.S. Department of the Interior held that animal advoca-
cy groups and individual plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Bureau of 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Id. at 617–18 (“[A]ppellant has failed to allege a sufficient nexus between her injury and the 
government action which she attacks to justify judicial intervention.”). 
 160 Meier, supra note 19, at 1284 (reasoning that in Linda R.S., a cause in fact analysis would 
have required details about, inter alia, the child’s father’s statements about preference for paying child 
support or serving jail time). 
 161 Id. at 1245, 1265 (describing proximate cause as a great fit with standing’s gatekeeper role 
because the court is saved from drawing inferences at the outset of litigation). 
 162 Id. at 1284 (“In Linda R.S., Justice Marshall’s conclusion that the plaintiff is without standing 
is based on an implicit understanding about the types of harms against which the Equal Protection 
Clause protects.”). 
 163 Id. at 1298 (explaining that proximate cause analysis furthers standing’s promotion of the 
separation of powers because it requires an implicit understanding of legislative intent). 
 164 Pushaw, supra note 88, at 6 (“[T]he Court only issues major standing opinions every few 
years.”). 
 165 See 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 166 See infra notes 167–203 and accompanying text. 
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Land Management’s (BLM) roundup of horses and use of holding facilities.167 
In district court, the plaintiffs challenged the BLM roundup, gather, and re-
moval of wild horses and burros in northeast California and northwest Nevada 
as violations of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“the Act”) and 
another federal statute.168 Only a few of the horses removed during the gather 
were returned to the range, with the remainder transferred to holding corrals.169 
The plaintiffs alleged that the BLM had violated several provisions of the Act 
during this roundup.170 Further, the plaintiffs contended that the relocation of 
excess horses to long-term holding facilities after the roundup was illegal un-
der the Act.171 
Before hearing the case on the merits, the court considered the threshold 
doctrine of standing.172 The court invoked the test from Lujan.173 As to the in-
jury requirement for standing, plaintiffs maintained that their injury in fact 
arose from the lost enjoyment and interaction with wild horses in their natural 
habitat.174 The court upheld this argument and found that the plaintiffs had es-
tablished a concrete and particularized injury in fact.175 
For the second requirement of causation, the court considered whether the 
plaintiff’s stated injury of diminished enjoyment of wild horses was fairly 
traceable to the relocation of the horses to long-term holding facilities.176 The 
plaintiffs argued that the scope of the BLM’s roundups would have been lim-
ited, if the BLM had been prohibited from using long-term holding facilities.177 
                                                                                                                           
 167 808 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1264 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that plaintiffs satisfied the Lujan test for 
standing). 
 168 Id. at 1260; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1333 (2012). 
 169 In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 1258 (“The roundup took 
place on September 19, 2010 and resulted in the gathering of 1,637 horses and 160 burros. After the 
round-up, 58 horses and one burro were returned to the range and the remainder were transferred to 
corrals where they will be either housed in short-term holding facilities where they will be available 
for adoption, or transferred to long-term pastures on private lands.”). 
 170 Id. at 1260. 
 171 Id. (alleging “violations of §§ 1331 and 1339, which prohibit BLM from relocating horses to 
public lands where horses do not presently exist, and did not exist in 1971”). 
 172 Id. at 1261 (“Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a federal court can only adju-
dicate an actual live ‘case or controversy,’ which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate standing.”) (citing 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009)). 
 173 Id. (“In order to establish standing, the plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact, which is 
defined as a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest; causation which is 
fairly traceable between the alleged injury in fact and alleged conduct of the defendant; and redressa-
bility.”). 
 174 See id. at 1262. 
 175 In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (“Plaintiffs need not 
establish the complete elimination of the animals they seek to conserve in order to have a recognized 
injury-in-fact in the lost ability to observe and enjoy those animals.”). 
 176 Id. at 1263. 
 177 Id. 
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They alleged that long-term holding facilities were restricted by the statute 
altogether.178 In response, the BLM argued that the plaintiffs faced the same 
outcome regardless of whether horses were transported to holding facilities, 
given away for adoption, or destroyed.179 The court sided with the plaintiffs 
and held that the BLM’s removal of the animals to holding facilities caused the 
plaintiffs’ stated injury.180 
For the third standing requirement, the plaintiffs argued that the Act pro-
vides an opportunity for redress because the Act permits the BLM to designate 
additional ranges on public lands.181 The court agreed again with the plaintiffs 
and found that the plaintiffs had met their burden on all three requirements and 
the case could proceed on the merits.182 
With the plaintiffs’ standing established, the court heard the case on the 
merits in November 2012.183 The court considered the more narrow issue of 
whether the BLM’s use of long-term holding facilities was illegal under the 
Act.184 The court found that although the Act does prevent the transport of 
“wild horses and burros ‘to areas of the public lands where they do not pres-
ently exist,’” the Act does not prohibit relocation of horses to private lands.185 
Further, because the BLM generally receives no funding for euthanizing 
healthy excess horses, relocation to private facilities is a necessary avenue for 
the BLM’s management of excess horses.186 The court found that congression-
al approval of funding for the BLM’s use of long-term private holding facili-
                                                                                                                           
 178 Id. The plaintiffs argued that outside adoption, the only expressly permitted means of disposal 
of the excess animals under the Wild Horse Act is to have them destroyed or sold. 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1333(b)(2), (e) (2012); In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. 
Therefore, had long-term holding facilities been unavailable, the defendants would not have removed 
more animals than they could have feasibly succeeded in adopting out. In Def. of Animals v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. 
 179 In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 1283. 
 180 Id. at 1264. 
 181 Id. (“Plaintiffs cite to 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a), which authorizes Defendant BLM to designate 
additional ranges on public lands as sanctuaries for the protection and preservation of wild horses and 
burros. Plaintiffs argue that even if the animals cannot be returned . . . they can still live in the West as 
Defendant BLM has the authority and discretion to designate additional ranges for horses and bur-
ros.”). 
 182 Id. 
 183 See In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183–84, 1194 
(E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 184 Id. at 1194. 
 185 See id. (implicitly finding that because the holding facilities in question were privately owned, 
the Act did not prohibit the relocation of horses to those holding facilities). 
 186 Id. (“In 1990, for example, the Appropriations Committee stated that it ‘continues to support 
the use of private sanctuaries as a method of removing unadopted wild horses and burros,’ and directs 
BLM to ‘continue to investigate private sanctuary proposals that are found to be humane and cost 
effective.’”). 
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ties supported this conclusion.187 Accordingly, the court held that the BLM’s 
manner of gathering the horses and placing them into holding facilities did not 
violate the provisions of the Act.188 
B. District of Columbia: Finding Lack of Standing Causation 
In contrast, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in In De-
fense of Animals v. Salazar came to a different conclusion came to a different 
conclusion on plaintiff’s standing to challenge the BLM’s use of holding facili-
ties in 2009.189 There, the BLM had developed a plan to capture all horses ex-
ceeding the appropriate management level (“AML”) in the Calico Mountains 
Complex in Nevada.190 The majority of the excess horses were to be moved to 
long-term holding facilities located in Kansas, Oklahoma, and South Dako-
ta.191 The plaintiffs brought suit seeking a preliminary injunction against the 
BLM’s decision to conduct the gather and place horses in holding facilities.192 
The district court denied the plaintiffs’ preliminary motion.193 Plaintiffs 
then challenged the BLM’s transporting of the removed horses to long-term 
holding facilities.194 The court reviewed the plaintiffs’ standing before consid-
ering the amended complaint on the merits.195 The court invoked the test from 
Lujan and required that the plaintiffs show a concrete injury in fact, that the 
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that the injury would be 
redressed.196 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Id. at 1194–95. 
 188 Id. at 1195. 
 189 675 F. Supp. 2d 89, 89 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 190 Id. at 92 (“The 3,040 horses currently estimated to live within the Complex exceed the . . . 
maximum AML of 952 by 2,088. To bring the horse population below the maximum AML, BLM has 
developed a plan to capture most of the Complex’s horses and take them from the range.”). 
 191 In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 713 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2010) (referring to the 
BLM’s 2009 planned gather and explaining that the “BLM conducted the proposed gather of horses 
from the Complex between December 28, 2009 and February 5, 2010. Approximately 2,000 wild 
horses were herded together and placed in a temporary holding facility in Fallon, Nevada, where they 
will remain at least until May 26, 2010, after which they may be relocated to long-term holding facili-
ties in the Midwest”); In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 96. 
 192 See In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 91, 96. 
 193 Id. at 103. 
 194 In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 24–25 (explaining that after the Court in 
2009 denied the plaintiffs’ preliminary motion, the court allowed intervening parties and the plaintiffs 
to amend their complaint); In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 104 (denying the prelimi-
nary injunction because the plaintiffs’ first claim was unlikely to succeed on the merits because it 
relied on a misunderstanding of the relevant statute and legislative intent, and indicating on the second 
claim that the plaintiffs failed to “establish imminent irreparable injury”). 
 195 In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
 196 Id. 
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Like in the Eastern District of California, the plaintiffs here claimed that 
they had suffered aesthetic and professional injury in fact by the removal of a 
number of horses from the Calico Mountains Complex.197 Although the court 
recognized this as an asserted injury, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed 
to show a sufficient causal nexus between the long-term holding and the as-
serted injury.198 To reach that conclusion, the court considered whether the 
plaintiffs were able to show that the removal of excess horses from the Com-
plex was fairly traceable to the agency’s plan to place some horses in long-
term holding facilities.199 
In support of standing causation, the plaintiffs alleged that the BLM’s use 
of holding facilities permanently displaces wild horses from the range in which 
plaintiffs observed them before the gather.200 The  district court found that 
whether or not the BLM used the holding facilities, some “excess” horses 
would necessarily be permanently removed from the range.201 The court con-
cluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish sufficient causation between the 
loss of personal enjoyment and the BLM’s use of long-term holding facili-
ties.202 For this reason, the court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to con-
fer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.203 
IV.  ADVOCATING FOR THE WILD HORSE CAUSE: APPLYING  
PROXIMATE CAUSE ANALYSIS TO STANDING CAUSATION ISSUES 
In considering whether plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Bureau of 
Land Management’s (BLM) use of holding facilities, two courts came to oppo-
site conclusions on the question of standing causation.204 The U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of California held that the plaintiffs had met the 
requirement for standing causation because the BLM’s use of the holding facil-
                                                                                                                           
 197 Id. at 27 (“They maintain that they intend to visit the Complex in the future to view the wild 
horses in the animals’ natural habitat, both for personal enjoyment and to further their professional 
interests in wild horses, and they contend that those interests will be impaired by the greatly reduced 
size of the herds in the Complex resulting from the gather of excess horses.”). 
 198 Id. at 27–28 (“[T]he causal relationship between long-term holding and the removal of many 
horses from the range has not been established; the plaintiffs have not shown that the removal of ex-
cess horses from the Complex was or is ‘fairly traceable’ to the agency’s plan to place some horses in 
long-term holding facilities in the Midwest.”). 
 199 See id. at 28. 
 200 See id. 
 201 Id. (explaining that it is an “undisputed fact that BLM’s determination that a certain number of 
gathered horses are ‘excess’ results in the permanent separation of those horses from the range”). 
 202 Id. at 28–29 (finding insufficient causation for standing because the plaintiffs could only spec-
ulate as to whether the BLM would be prevented from using holding facilities). 
 203 Id. at 29. 
 204 See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
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ities was fairly traceable to the plaintiff’s injury.205 Alternatively, in the District 
of Columbia, where standing analysis tends to be read more narrowly,206 the 
district court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the BLM’s use of 
holding facilities was fairly traceable to the plaintiff’s injury.207 As further evi-
denced by these cases and the ensuing potential circuit split, the ambiguities in 
the standing doctrine illustrate a need for the Supreme Court’s clarification.208 
A. Benefits of Clarifying Standing Causation 
The lack of guidance in standing causation has affected the consistency of 
judicial reasoning among the lower courts.209 This inconsistency, however, 
does not comport with judicial efficiency, one of the underlying purposes of 
the standing doctrine.210 The inconsistency also presents obstacles for litigants 
who are prevented from getting their cases heard on the merits depending on 
the court in which they file.211 Consider that without a favorable finding on 
standing causation in the Eastern District of California, In Defense of Animals 
                                                                                                                           
 205 In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1264 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 206 Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 684 F.3d 102, 146 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (per curiam) (holding that state petitioners must show a concrete and particularized injury in 
fact); North Carolina v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 587 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that states 
must show Article III standing even if owed special solicitude); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 478–79 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding causation too speculative for 
standing); WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 859 F. Supp. 2d 83, 96 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding redressabil-
ity too speculative for standing); Charles Riordan, Comment, Barring the Gates: Timing and Tailor-
ing Environmental Standing and Greenhouse Gas Regulation After Corri v. EPA, 40 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 567, 575 (2013). 
 207 In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 713 F. Supp. 2d 20, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 208 See Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal 
Criminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 456 (2001) (explaining that when circuits come to different 
interpretations on a statute, for example, the Supreme Court can agree to hear a case to resolve the 
split). 
 209 See Meier, supra note 19, at 1244–45 (explaining that “[l]ower federal courts routinely strug-
gle to apply the causation prong of standing because of uncertainty as to which analysis is required”); 
Pushaw, supra note 88, at 52 (arguing that, regarding standing, “the Court has reached inconsistent 
(even contradictory) results in cases that presented materially indistinguishable facts”). 
 210 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 211 See In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (holding that 
because the plaintiffs had standing, they could proceed to the merits); In Def. of Animals v. Salazar, 
713 F. Supp. 2d. at 29 (holding that because plaintiffs failed to meet the causation prong of standing, 
the litigation could not proceed to the merits); supra notes 166–202 and accompanying text. These 
two cases illustrate how litigants can achieve varying outcomes depending on the forum in which they 
file. See Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 168 (2000) (ex-
plaining that generally “litigants can regularly affect the outcome of their dispute by where they file 
suit and how they cast their claims”). Forum shopping is “the practice of choosing the most favorable 
jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 
2010). 
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would not have had its case against the BLM heard on the merits.212 As a result 
of the favorable finding, however, In Defense of Animals was allowed the op-
portunity to litigate its issues and present support for the wild horse cause.213 
Embracing clarity in judicial decisionmaking, especially regarding juris-
dictional issues such as standing, would be beneficial to both litigants and 
courts.214 Clarification on standing causation would benefit litigants by en-
hancing the predictability of success and promoting the efficient use of re-
sources.215 In other words, as a result of clarification, litigants could better as-
sess the probability of success before engaging in costly litigation.216 This in 
turn would support judicial efficiency because it would conserve judicial re-
sources.217 Thus, if the issue is appealed, the Supreme Court should consider 
clarifying the standing causation issue in the wild horse dispute to support ju-
dicial efficiency and promote predictability at the outset of litigation.218 
The wild horse dispute serves an optimal platform for promoting efficien-
cy and predictability by addressing standing causation.219 The Court has been 
reluctant to address standing causation for political reasons even through to its 
most recent standing case, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy.220 The Court in 2007 avoided a politically charged issue altogether by 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (holding that 
plaintiffs could proceed to the merits because they had standing); supra notes 175–179 and accompa-
nying text. 
 213 In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 909 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2012); see 
supra notes 184–189. Until a case is heard on the merits, litigants are prevented from asserting 
“proofs and reasoned arguments” in support of their cause. Tidmarsh, supra note 13, at 412–13 (“It is 
the guarantee of a full opportunity—unfettered by concerns for expense, delay, or advancing certain 
political interests—that defines the ‘on the merits’ principle.”). 
 214 Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (explain-
ing that both the court and litigants would be better served if resources were primarily spent litigating 
the merits as opposed to establishing subject matter jurisdiction, a situation which arises from judicial 
uncertainty). 
 215 See id. at 7 (“A jurisdictional defect raised late in the proceedings can undo all of the litigation 
time and effort the parties and court have spent.”); Richard L. Hurford, The Business Case for Smart 
Dispute Resolution Processes, MICH. B.J., June 2010, at 42, 43 (“Predicting the outcome of litigation 
requires evaluating the reaction of a judge and jury to the merits.”). 
 216 See Dodson, supra note 214, at 8 (“stating that “jurisdictional clarity generally reduces litigant 
costs”); Tidmarsh, supra note 13, at 408 (explaining that procedural reform, generally, can prevent 
costly litigation). 
 217 Dodson supra note 214, at 8 (“[W]hen the court does resolve a jurisdictional issue under clear 
doctrine, that decision is likely to be accurate, causing fewer appeals and fewer reversals.”); see supra 
note 89 and accompanying text. 
 218 See infra notes 221–222 and accompanying text. 
 219 See infra notes 220–221 and accompanying text. 
 220 See 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007); supra notes 125–131 and accompanying text. 
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agreeing to the EPA’s stipulation of causation.221 Here, the Court could review 
the wild horse dispute because it provides a less politically contentious plat-
form to clarify the Court’s analysis of standing causation.222 This clarification 
would particularly benefit wild horse and environmental advocates by enhanc-
ing their ability to weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing costly litigation on 
their particular issues.223 
B. Justifications for Proximate Cause Analysis  
in Wild Horse Litigation 
If the issue presents itself, the Court should use tort law to resolve stand-
ing causation ambiguities in the wild horse dispute.224 The Court’s language in 
standing jurisprudence already suggests that the Court has invoked tort law 
theories in its analysis.225 Although the Court’s language suggests that it uses a 
cause in fact analysis, a proximate cause inquiry runs throughout the Court’s 
decisions.226 Application of proximate cause analysis in this context would 
promote the gatekeeper function of the standing doctrine as well as separation 
of powers.227 
Application of proximate cause analysis to standing ambiguities in the 
wild horse dispute would first promote standing’s role as a gatekeeper to litiga-
tion. Given the limited availability of factual evidence at the outset of litiga-
tion, the fact-intensive cause in fact inquiry would not be appropriate in the 
standing causation determination of the wild horse dispute.228 Consider again 
Linda R.S. In a thorough cause in fact analysis, the Court would have consid-
ered circumstantial evidence such as information about the father and his tes-
timony.229 Since there is no mention of this evidence in the opinion, scholars 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 523; Meier, supra note 19, at 1296 (call-
ing global warming a controversial modern issue in national politics); supra notes 125–131 and ac-
companying text. 
 222 See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 505 (identifying global warming as the 
most urgent environmental issue today). 
 223 See Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits After Buckhannon Board & 
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services, 8 ENVTL. L. 589, 610 
(2002) (explaining that “[e]nvironmental litigation is extremely costly and requires substantial re-
sources rarely at the disposal of environmental public interest groups”); Walter B. Russell, III, Note, 
Awards of Attorney’s Fees in Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the “Appropriate” Stand-
ard, 18 GA. L. REV. 307, 327 (1984) (explaining that public interest groups are limited in their pursuit 
of environmental litigation due to lack of funding). 
 224 See infra notes 229–235 and accompanying text. 
 225 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 226 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 227 See supra notes 160–161, 163 and accompanying text. 
 228 See supra notes 160–161 and accompanying text. 
 229 Meier, supra note 19, at 1294 (developing a hypothetical set of facts—not written in the actual 
decision—necessary for a court to apply cause in fact analysis to determine standing causation). 
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argue that the Court most likely could not perform a true cause in fact analy-
sis.230 Accordingly, due to the inherent limitations of a fact-intensive inquiry 
before reaching the merits of the wild horse dispute, the Court should instead 
apply a proximate cause inquiry to resolve standing causation.231  
Applying a proximate cause inquiry to standing causation in the wild 
horse dispute would also promote the separation of powers. Standing funda-
mentally derives from a concern for the separation of powers.232 A proximate 
cause analysis would maintain separation of powers by requiring a federal 
court to consider the congressional intent behind the Wild Free-Roaming 
Horses and Burros Act (“the Act”).233 Ultimately, the Court considers whether 
the substantive law was designed to be used in the way the plaintiff applies 
it.234 Thus, applying a proximate cause analysis to standing causation in the 
wild horse dispute would promote both standing’s gatekeeper function and the 
separation of powers.235 
C. Applying Proximate Cause Analysis to the Standing Causation 
Ambiguity in Wild Horse Litigation 
To apply proximate cause analysis to the litigation of wild horse holding 
facilities, the Supreme Court would invoke the foreseeability or scope of the 
risk tests.236 Using either test, the Court would ask whether the plaintiff’s harm 
is one of the foreseeable consequences of the BLM’s use of holding facili-
ties.237 Because the holding facility issue involves a potential violation of a 
federal statute,238 the Court would inquire into the legislative intent of the 
Act.239 The Court would ask why Congress created the Act and the types of 
injuries that the Act was intended to address.240 
                                                                                                                           
 230 Id. at 1283, 1294. 
 231 See id. at 1249 (explaining that applying a proximate cause inquiry assumes the presence of 
sufficient factual support for a cause in fact analysis). 
 232 See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); Mank, supra note 85, at 7–8; 
Pushaw, supra note 88, at 23; supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 233 See Meier, supra note 19, at 1280 (applying proximate cause analysis to standing causation 
cases involving statutory violations requires an understanding of legislative intent); supra notes 153 
and accompanying text. 
 234 See Meier, supra note 19, at 1280. 
 235 See supra notes 227–234 and accompanying text 
 236 See Meier, supra note 19, at 1250 (explaining that courts can use either of two proximate 
cause tests: scope of the risk and foreseeability). 
 237 See id. 
 238 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2012). 
 239 Id. §§ 1331–1333; Meier, supra note 19, at 1280. 
 240 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1333; Meier, supra note 19, at 1280. 
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The Act was a response to nationwide concern regarding the plight of 
American wild horses, which were at that time quickly disappearing.241 The 
language of the Act’s preamble provides that wild horses are protected because 
“they contribute to the diversity of life forms within the Nation and enrich the 
lives of the American people.”242 The Act also serves to protect horses “from 
capture, branding, harassment, or death.”243 
Applying the proximate cause test to this language, the Court would con-
sider the harm sought to be prevented by the law.244 Although the Act explicit-
ly protects against harm to the wild horses themselves,245 the wild horse dis-
pute does not involve allegations of harm to the animals, but rather to the hu-
man interests involved.246 
As a result, in the wild horse dispute, the Court would consider whether 
the harm to the plaintiff also falls within the scope of harms protected against 
by the legislation.247 The Court would ask whether the plaintiff’s harm at-
tributed to the BLM’s use of the holding facilities implicates public policy 
concerns.248 To that end, the Court would find that the Act protects wild horses 
that “contribute to . . . and enrich the lives of the American people.”249 As 
                                                                                                                           
 241 16 U.S.C. § 1331; Pitt, supra note 7, at 507. 
 242 16 U.S.C. § 1331. 
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 246 Id.; In Def. of Animals v. Dep’t of the Interior, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (alleging injury in the 
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the Endangered Species Act . . . the bird (Loxioides bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honey-
creeper family, also has legal status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own 
right.”). Contra Joseph Mendelson, III, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of Standing Under 
the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795, 806 (1997) (“[C]ourts routinely have de-
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 247 See Meier, supra note 19, at 1280.  
 248 See Bahadur, supra note 154, at 75–76 (explaining that public policy drives the permissible 
scope of liability within proximate cause analysis). 
 249 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (“It is the policy of Congress that wild free-roaming horses and burros shall 
be protected from capture, branding, harassment, or death; and to accomplish this they are to be con-
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such, the Court would most likely find that the plaintiffs’ lives are enriched by 
the aesthetic and recreational enjoyment of the species.250 As a matter of public 
policy, the Court would find that the plaintiff’s injury, the diminished enjoy-
ment of wild horses, falls within the law’s scope of protection.251 The Court 
should conclude that the plaintiff’s harm is one of the foreseeable consequenc-
es of the BLM’s use of the holding facilities, which makes the BLM’s conduct 
unreasonable in the first place.252 
In evaluating standing causation in the wild horse dispute, the Court 
would consider that instead of returning horses to public lands, the BLM 
placed horses in holding facilities for the rest of the horses’ lives.253 In so do-
ing, the plaintiffs were harmed by the loss of aesthetic and recreational enjoy-
ment of the species in their natural habitat.254 Considering the legislative intent 
behind the Act, the Court would find that the BLM’s use of holding facilities is 
fairly traceable to the plaintiff’s enjoyment.255 As a policy consideration, the 
Court should find it is fair to hold the BLM liable for the harm it has caused to 
plaintiffs.256 
Thus, if the issue arises, the Court should apply proximate cause analysis 
to resolve standing causation in the wild horse dispute.257 In so doing, the 
Court would first clarify long-standing ambiguities in the standing causation 
doctrine to the benefit of efficiency and predictability.258 In applying proxi-
mate cause analysis specifically, the Court would promote both standing’s 
gatekeeper function and the separation of powers.259 Unlike more potentially 
contentious cases such as Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
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the wild horse dispute serves as an appropriate platform for this clarifica-
tion.260 
CONCLUSION 
The American wild horse is an American icon and an integral part of the 
western ecosystem. Through the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 
1971, Congress has embodied these sentiments by explicitly protecting against 
wild horse abuse. Although the Act provides for the removal of horses above 
the population limit, it does not necessarily provide for the use of holding fa-
cilities in which horses live out the remainder of their lives off the range. 
When activists challenged the BLM’s use of these holding facilities, two 
courts came to opposite conclusions on plaintiff standing. Specifically, the 
courts’ conclusions differed in respect to standing causation, the analysis of 
which the Supreme Court has not yet clarified for lower courts. If the issue 
rises to the level of a circuit split, the Court should hear the wild horse dispute 
to clarify standing causation and provide greater consistency for lower courts 
and litigants. In that case, the Court should employ proximate cause analysis to 
promote standing’s gatekeeper function and separation of powers. The clarifi-
cation would further benefit wild horse and environmental advocates by en-
hancing their ability to weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing costly litiga-
tion. 
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